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Barry Eichengreen and Andrew K. Rose 
I have studied foreign exchange crises, 
their technique and their history, too. 
And even-alas-their  theory, 
With ardent labour through and through. 
Yet here I stand, as wise, poor fool, 
As when I first went to school. 
-Einzig  (1968) 
2.1  Introduction 
Currency crises cluster in time. Figure 2.1, constructed from quarterly data 
for 20 industrial countries, is dominated by a few spikes indicating clusters of 
speculative attacks in particular quarters, separated by long periods of tranquil- 
lity. (Crises are episodes when the exchange rate depreciates, interest rates are 
raised to defend it, or reserves are expended to fend off speculative pressure 
and maintain the currency peg. We  discuss the construction of the data under- 
lying this figure in section 2.3 below.) Why crises should be distributed in this 
way has become a matter of some concern in the wake of the turbulence in 
the European Monetary System (EMS) in  1992-93  and the “tequila effect” 
associated with the Mexican meltdown in 1994-95. 
A popular explanation for the pattern is that crises spread contagiously across 
countries. An attack on one currency, the argument runs, increases the probabil- 
ity of an attack on another. Even after controlling for the effects of movements in 
economic fundamentals like money supplies, output, and the current account of 
the balance of payments, an attack on one currency is believed to increase the 
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Fig. 2.1  Crises per quarter 
probability  of an attack on another in the same or immediately  subsequent 
period. 
One can think of a number of channels through which instability in foreign 
exchange markets might be transmitted across countries. One is the impact of 
a speculative attack on the current and prospective international competitive- 
ness of the countries concerned and hence on their current accounts. Thus the 
attack on the United Kingdom in September 1992 and sterling's subsequent 
depreciation are said to have damaged the international competitiveness of the 
Republic of Ireland, for which the United Kingdom is the single most impor- 
tant export market, and to have provoked the attack on the punt at the beginning 
of 1993. Finland's devaluation in September 1992 was widely regarded as hav- 
ing had negative repercussions for Sweden, not so much because of direct trade 
between the two countries as because their exporters competed in the same 
third markets. Attacks on Spain in 1992-93  and the depreciation of the peseta 
are said to have damaged the international competitiveness of Portugal, which 
relies heavily on the Spanish export market, and to have provoked an attack on 
the escudo despite the virtual absence of imbalances in domestic fundamentals. 
Trade links may  not be the only channel of  transmission, of course. It is 
difficult to argue, for example, that the tequila effect-the  pressure applied to 
currencies in Latin America and East Asia following the crash of the Mexican 
peso in 1994-stemmed  from strong trade links between Mexico and the other 31  Contagious Currency Crises 
countries concerned. Argentina and Brazil may have traded extensively with 
Mexico, but the same was not true of Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
Rather than  focusing on trade  links, commentators pointed to  similarities 
across countries in macroeconomic policies and conditions (see, e.g., Sachs, 
Tornell, and Velasco 1996). 
Thus one can imagine a second model focusing on comovements in macro- 
economic policies and conditions in the countries subject to attack. Evidence 
that certain market participants are skeptical about the stability of a currency 
may lead their colleagues to suspect that they are also skeptical about the pros- 
pects for the currencies of other countries in a similar macroeconomic position. 
Difficulties in one country pursuing a program of exchange-rate-based stabili- 
zation, for example, might lead currency traders to revise their assessment of 
the likelihood that other countries pursuing this macroeconomic strategy will 
carry it off. An attack on one currency and the issuing government’s response 
to the pressure may thus provide new information relevant for expectations of 
how other governments will respond if  placed in a similar position. For ex- 
ample, evidence that a country with an unusually high unemployment rate suc- 
cumbed to a speculative attack and abandoned its currency peg out of reluc- 
tance to raise interest rates if  that meant further aggravating unemployment 
might lead investors to revise their expectations of  the likelihood that other 
countries in similar positions would be prepared to do so. 
These two interpretations emphasizing different channels of  international 
transmission of currency crises have different empirical implications. The in- 
terpretation emphasizing trade links suggests that currency crises will spread 
contagiously among countries that trade disproportionately with one another. 
The interpretation emphasizing economic and political commonalities sug- 
gests that instability will instead infect countries in broadly similar economic 
and political positions. 
An entirely different view is that currency crises do not spread contagiously; 
rather, the clustering in figure 2.1 reflects the independent impact on different 
currencies of national economic factors that move together over time (perhaps 
because they emanate from a country at the center of  international financial 
activity). Global macroeconomic conditions can cause national unemployment 
rates to rise and fall in tandem; if  high unemployment weakens the resolve 
with which governments are prepared to defend their currency pegs, for ex- 
ample, one will see clusters of speculative attacks in periods of global slow- 
down. In this view, several currencies are attacked simultaneously because the 
countries in question are all experiencing unemployment that leaves their gov- 
ernments reluctant to adopt the restrictive policies needed to defend the ex- 
change rate. But while crises cluster in time, there is no causal connection 
between their occurrence in one country and another, and no contagion, strictly 
speaking. Rather, the coincidence of currency crises reflects common environ- 
mental factors conducive to instability in all the countries concerned. This ex- 
planation has featured prominently in  official post mortems of  the 1992-93 32  Barry Eichengreen and Andrew K. Rose 
crises in the EMS (Commission of the European Communities 1993; Commit- 
tee of  Governors of  the Central Banks  1993a, 1993b), crises that coincided 
with a pan-European recession. It resonates with the literature on the tequila 
effect that emphasizes the role played by rising US.  interest rates (a common 
environmental factor) in the balance-of-payments difficulties of  the various 
Latin American and East Asian countries (see, e.g., Dooley, Fernandez-Arias, 
and Kletzer 1996; Sachs et al. 1996). 
In principle, one can test this explanation by  controlling for environmental 
factors when analyzing the impact of speculative attacks in neighboring coun- 
tries. If  environmental factors account for the clustering of  attacks, then the 
incidence of crises in neighboring countries-a  proxy for contagion-should 
have no additional effect when environmental controls are included in the anal- 
ysis. In collaboration with Charles Wyplosz, we have taken this approach in 
previous papers (Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz 1995, 1996). Employing a 
panel data set for 20 countries spanning a third of a century, we found that a 
crisis elsewhere in the world increased the probability of a crisis in the subject 
country by 8 percentage points, even after controlling for observable economic 
fundamentals. Our contagion proxy was constructed in the simplest possible 
way, as a binary indicator that equals unity if  there is a currency crisis else- 
where in the world in the same period, and zero otherwise. Thus this approach 
disregards both the number of countries experiencing speculative attacks at a 
point in time and their economic proximity to one another. In effect, we treat 
an attack on the Finnish markka as of equal relevance for the Swedish krona, 
the French franc, and the Japanese yen. 
This assumption is unlikely to be strictly correct, and even if it were there 
would remain the practical problem of controlling adequately for common en- 
vironmental factors. There is always the possibility that the significance of the 
coefficient on the contagion proxy reflects a common omitted influence affect- 
ing both the subject country and its neighbors, which may be unobservable and 
will in any case be difficult to control for convincingly. This situation is famil- 
iar to epidemiologists who seek to determine whether the incidence of infec- 
tion in  a population reflects the contagious nature of  the virus bearing the 
disease or the disease-conducive nature of the environment in which that popu- 
lation resides. 
The obvious treatment is to impose additional structure on the problem by 
modeling the channels of transmission. We  take this approach in the present 
paper. We again ask whether the likelihood of a crisis rises significantly when 
there is also a crisis elsewhere, after controlling for economic fundamentals 
in the countries concerned. But we weight crises elsewhere in the world by 
country characteristics intended to capture the extent to which contagion is 
transmitted through  specific channels. We  compare two different weighting 
schemes. First, on the assumption that countries that trade disproportionately 
with one another are prone to contagion operating through the competitiveness 
effects of  crisis-induced exchange rate changes, we  weight crises in neigh- 33  Contagious Currency Crises 
boring countries by the importance of trade with those countries. Second, on 
the assumption that crises and governments’ reactions to them lead investors 
to revise their expectations of officials’ resolve in similar ways with respect to 
countries in broadly similar macroeconomic positions, we weight crises by the 
similarity of macroeconomic policies and outcomes. 
The results support the hypothesis that speculative attacks in foreign ex- 
change markets spread contagiously across countries. Our trade-weighted mea- 
sure of  crises elsewhere in  the world is important economically as well as 
being significant statistically at high levels of confidence; it is robust to a vari- 
ety of sensitivity tests. Our macro-weighted measure of crises does not display 
the same level of significance.  Although it is always possible that our empirical 
measures of macroeconomic contagion are not capturing these phenomena ad- 
equately, we are inclined to interpret these results as suggesting that trade, 
rather than revisions of  expectations based on macroeconomic factors, has 
been the dominant channel of transmission for contagious currency crises for 
the bulk of the sample period. 
Importantly, however, the trade- and macro-weighted specifications  both out- 
perform the naive model of contagion estimated in our previous paper when 
they are included one at a time in alternative specifications. This supports the 
interpretation of our results in terms of contagion rather than omitted environ- 
mental variables. It is nevertheless appropriate to err on the side of caution: 
inevitably, there remains the possibility that the size and significance of  the 
coefficient on our contagion variable reflect an unmeasured shock to funda- 
mentals that strikes several countries simultaneously. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes what 
the literature has to say about contagion. Section 2.3 describes our data and 
methodology. Section 2.4 presents results and sensitivity analysis. Section 2.5 
summarizes the findings and sets out the agenda for research. 
2.2  Speculative Attacks and Contagion 
The classic Krugman (1979) model of  speculative attacks on pegged ex- 
change rates, from which the subsequent literature derives, provides no obvi- 
ous mechanisms for the contagious spread of currency crises. Domestic prices 
are given by  purchasing power parity; it is not possible for relative prices to 
move and the currency to become undervalued subsequent to a successful at- 
tack and to thereby create competitive difficulties for a country’s trading part- 
ners. There is no uncertainty in the Krugman model; with full information, 
the timing of the attack is determined by the relationship between the pegged 
exchange rate and the shadow rate (that which would prevail if official inter- 
vention in the foreign exchange market were abandoned); thus it is not possible 
for a speculative attack abroad to affect the timing of an attack on the subject 
country by resolving uncertainty about governments’ preferences and options. 
Subsequent work extended the Krugman model in ways that make it easier 34  Barry Eichengreen and Andrew K. Rose 
to accommodate the possibility of  contagious speculative attacks. Willman 
(1988) and  Goldberg  (1994) endogenized relative prices,  allowing events 
abroad to influence the real exchange rate and domestic competitiveness.  Flood 
and Garber (1984) and Claessens (1991) introduced uncertainty about the do- 
mestic policy process. Flood and Garber, followed by Obstfeld (1986), added 
the idea of  a contingent policy process, in which one-time events could lead 
the authorities to substitute  one policy for another, thereby introducing  the pos- 
sibility of self-fulfilling speculative attacks. 
While these extensions introduced channels through which currency crises 
can arise as a result of events in neighboring countries, as a result of extraneous 
events, and even as a result of  speculative pressure itself, none of  them was 
explicitly concerned with contagion. Work explicitly concerned with conta- 
gious currency crises was then stimulated by the EMS crises of  1992-93  and 
the Mexican crisis of  1994-95. Gerlach and Smets (1994) considered a model 
of two countries linked by trade in merchandise and financial assets. In their 
setup, a successful attack on one exchange rate leads to its real depreciation, 
which enhances the competitiveness of the country's merchandise exports. This 
produces a trade deficit in the second country, a gradual decline in the reserves 
of its central bank, and ultimately an attack on its currency.  A second channel 
for contagious transmission is the impact of crisis and depreciation in the first 
country on the import prices and the overall price level in the second. Postcrisis 
real depreciation in the first country depresses import prices in the second. In 
turn, this reduces its consumer price index and the demand for money by its 
residents. Their efforts to swap domestic currency for foreign exchange then 
deplete the reserves of the central bank, conceivably culminating in an attack. 
A second class of models developed the idea that there can exist multiple 
equilibria in foreign exchange markets (e.g., Flood and Garber 1984; Obstfeld 
1986). If  traders expect a currency to be devalued and act accordingly, they 
may so increase the cost of defending the peg that the authorities will choose 
to abandon it instead and shift to a more expansionary policy; under these 
circumstances, speculative attacks can be self-fulfilling. Thus, if a successful 
attack on one currency leads financial market participants to revise their expec- 
tations about the intentions of  other governments and resolves uncertainty 
about whether those other governments will have the wherewithal to defend 
their currencies, instability can spread contagiously across markets.' 
Subsequent work has identified still other potential channels for the conta- 
gious spread of currency crises.*  But these two classes of analysis, focusing on 
I. This approach has much in common with the literature in closed economy finance on infor- 
mation cascades and wisdom after the fact, in which a large movement in the price of one financial 
asset can  lead traders to revise  their expectations  about  the prices  of  others (see Caplin and 
Leahy 1994). 
2. One such paper providing an analysis of contagious currency crises is Goldfajn and ValdCs 
(1995). They focus on the role of illiquidity in financial markets. A key feature of their model is 
the introduction of  financial intermediaries. These authors show how,  in the presence of  such 
intermediaries, small disturbances can provoke large-scale runs on a currency. Intermediaries sup- 
ply liquid assets to foreigners unwilling to commit to long-term investments; i.e., they provide 35  Contagious Currency Crises 
trade and informational effects, are at the center of the literature. To this point, 
however, theory has run ahead of empirics. The remainder of this paper makes 
a modest attempt to rectify this imbalance. 
2.3  Data and Methodology 
We  analyze a panel of quarterly macroeconomic and political data covering 
20 industrial countries from 1959 through 1993 (a total of 2,800 observations). 
We pose the following question: is the incidence of a currency crisis in a partic- 
ular country at a given point in time (e.g., France in the third quarter of  1992) 
correlated with the incidence of a currency crisis in a different country (e.g., 
the United Kingdom) at the same point in time, even after taking into account 
the effects of current and lagged domestic macroeconomic and political influ- 
ences? While the finding of a positive partial correlation is consistent with the 
existence of contagion, since it implies that speculative attacks are temporally 
correlated even after conditioning on domestic factors, we are reluctant to in- 
terpret this as proof of contagion, since it may reflect an unmeasured common 
shock to economic fundamentals that strikes several countries simultaneously 
(or an unmeasured shock to Germany, our center country) rather than spillovers 
from one country to anothet3 
2.3.1  Measuring Currency Crises 
The first issue that must be confronted is how to determine when a specula- 
tive attack has occurred. Having addressed this issue in a number of previous 
papers (Eichengreen et al. 1995, 1996), we provide only a summary of  our 
thinking here. 
Currency crises cannot be identified with actual devaluations, revaluations, 
and instances in which the currency is floated, for two reasons!  First, not all 
speculative attacks are successful. The currency may be supported through the 
expenditure of reserves by  the central bank or by foreign central banks and 
 government^.^ The authorities may repel attacks by  raising interest rates and 
adopting other policies of  austerity. Further, many realignments are taken de- 
liberately in tranquil periods, possibly to preclude future attacks. 
Ideally, an index of speculative pressure would be obtained by employing a 
maturity transformation services. By offering attractive terms on liquid deposits, their presence 
augments the volume of capital inflows. But when, for exogenous reasons, foreign investors with- 
draw their deposits, intermediaries unable to costlessly liquidate their assets face the risk of failure. 
Hence, a hank run can produce a self-fulfilling banking crisis (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). in the 
same way that a run on the currency can provoke a self-fulfilling exchange rate crisis. Moreover, 
the run on intermediaries can spill over into a run on the currency as foreign investors withdraw 
their deposits and convert them into foreign exchange. These crises can spread contagiously to 
other countries when international investors encountering liquidity difficulties as a result of  the 
banking crisis in one country respond by liquidating their positions in other national markets. 
3. We return to this point below. 
4. We  refer to actual changes in exchange rates and in exchange arrangements as “events” to 
5.  And occasionally by the actual or threatened imposition of capital controls. 
distinguish them from the “crises” that are the focus of our analysis. 36  Barry Eichengreen and Andrew K. Rose 
structural model of exchange rate determination, from which one would derive 
the excess demand for foreign exchange. In practice, however, empirical mod- 
els linking macroeconomic variables to the exchange rate have little explana- 
tory power at short and intermediate horizons.6  In the absence of an empirically 
valid macromodel, we resort to an ad hoc approach, the intuition for which is 
derived from the well-known model of exchange market pressure due to Girton 
and Roper (1977). The idea is that an  excess demand for foreign exchange 
can be met through several (not mutually exclusive) channels. If the attack is 
successful, depreciation or devaluation occurs. But the authorities may instead 
accommodate the pressure by  running down their international reserves or de- 
ter the attack by raising interest rates. As a measure of  speculative pressure, 
we therefore construct a weighted average of exchange rate changes, reserve 
changes, and interest rate changes, measuring all variables relative to those 
prevailing in Germany, the reference country. The index of exchange market 
pressure then becomes 
where e,, denotes the price of  a deutsche mark  in i’s  currency at time t; ic 
denotes the short German interest; r denotes the ratio of international reserves;’ 
and a,  P, and y are weights. 
We define crises as extreme values of this index: 
Crisisi,, = 1  if EMC,,  >  1.5~~~~  + F~~~, 
= 0  otherwise, 
where kEMp  and uEMP  are the sample mean and standard deviation of EMP, re- 
spectively. 
A  critical step is weighting the three components of the index. One obvious 
option is an unweighted average, which has the advantage of  simplicity. But 
since the volatilities of reserves, exchange rates, and interest differentials are 
very different, we instead weight the components so as to equalize the volatili- 
ties of the three components, preventing any one of them from dominating the 
index. We  then check the sensitivity of  our results to this scheme (subsection 
2.4.5). 
We identify quarters in which our index of speculative  pressure is at least 1.5 
standard deviations above the sample mean as instances of speculative attack 
(although we  again test for sensitivity with respect to this arbitrarily chosen 
threshold). To avoid counting the same crisis more than once, we exclude the 
later observation(s) when two (or more) crises occur in  successive quarters 
(though it would be interesting for future researchers to examine long-lived 
crises explicitly). Thus our “exclusion window” is one quarter (though again 
6. Frankel and Rose (1995) provide a recent survey. 
7. Following Girton and Roper, r is actually the ratio of reserves to narrow money (MI). 37  Contagious Currency Crises 
we vary this parameter). We refer to our noncrisis observations as “tranquil” 
periods and use these as the control group.* 
Our choice of a one-quarter exclusion window (so that each country contri- 
butes no more than two observations annually) and a 1.5 standard deviation 
outlier threshold produces a sample of  77 crises and  1,179 periods of  tran- 
q~illity.~ 
The crisis observations are not randomly distributed. There are clusters of 
speculative attacks in  1973 (at the time of the breakup of the Bretton Woods 
system) and in 1992 (at the time of the European currency crises), as displayed 
in figure 2.1 above. 
2.3.2  Data 
Most of the financial and macroeconomic variables that we utilize are taken 
from the CD-ROM version of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Inter- 
national Financial Statistics (IFS).  The data set is quarterly, spanning 1959-93 
for 20 industrial countries.’O It has been checked for transcription and other 
errors and corrected. Most of  the variables are transformed into differential 
percentage changes by taking differences between domestic and German annu- 
alized fourth-differences of natural logarithms and multiplying by  100. 
We employ the following variables: total nongold international reserves (IFS 
line  1  Id); period-average exchange rates (line rf); short-term interest rates 
(money market rates [line 6Ob] where possible, discount rates otherwise [line 
601); exports and imports (both measured in dollars, lines 70d and 71d, respec- 
tively); the current account (line 77a.d, converted to domestic currency) and 
the central government budget position (line SO), both measured as percentages 
of nominal GDP (frequently line 99a); long-term government bond yields (line 
61); a nominal stock market index (line 62, which sets 1990 = 100); domestic 
credit (line 32); M1 (line 34); M2 (line 35 + MI); the CPI (line 64); and real 
GDP (usually line 99a.r). We use the real effective exchange rate as a measure 
of competitiveness (line reu, which uses normalized relative unit labor costs), 
though this variable is only available from 1975. 
We  also utilize a number of  labor market indicators not included in IFS. 
Data on total employment, the unemployment rate, and the business sector 
wage rate were drawn from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s Main Economic Indicators. To capture political conditions we 
8. Just as we do not allow crises in successive quarters to count as independent observations by 
excluding the later observations, we also do not allow two successive periods of tranquillity to 
count as independent observations. We do this by  applying our exclusion window to periods of 
both crisis and tranquillity. Our exclusion window should also reduce potential problems with 
serial correlation that might occur if EMP is close to our 1.5~  threshold. 
9. However, missing data will preclude use of some of  these observations. 
10. The countries in our sample are (in order of IMF country number): the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Australia, along with 
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construct indicators of  governmental electoral victories and defeats, using 
Keesing’s Record  of  World Events  and Banks’s Political  Handbook  of  the 
World. 
Finally, we use a list of exchange market “events” (devaluations, flotations, 
changes in exchange rate bandwidths, etc.). These are gleaned from the IMF’s 
annual report Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. These vol- 
umes also provide us the basis for constructing dummy variables indicating the 
pEesence of capital controls. 
The available data on international reserves are less than ideal for a number 
of  well-known reasons. Off-balance sheet transactions, third-party interven- 
tion, standby credits, and foreign liabilities, all of which are relevant for for- 
eign exchange intervention, tend to be omitted or incompletely reported. Short- 
duration attacks (especially unsuccessful ones) may not be evident in quarterly 
data. Finally, subtle changes in actual or anticipated capital controls, while 
difficult to measure, may in fact be quite important, especially when countries 
are mounting defenses against speculative attacks. 
2.3.3  Testing for Contagion 
We  test the null hypothesis that the incidence of currency crises elsewhere 
in the world at the same point in time does not affect the probability of  a 
speculative attack on the domestic currency. While our model attempts to con- 
trol for the influence of  a wide range of  current and lagged macroeconomic 
variables, it is nonstructural. This is one reason to view our evidence (which 
turns out to be inconsistent with the null at standard confidence levels) as con- 
sistent with but not definitive proof of contagion. 
We estimate a binary probit model, linking our dependent variable (an indi- 
cator variable that takes on a value of unity for a speculative attack and zero 
otherwise) to our controls with maximum likelihood, including additional re- 
gressors to capture the effects of macroeconomic and political influences that 
affect crisis incidence. We  cast our net as widely as possible, including (1) 
presence of capital controls; (2) electoral victory or defeat of the government; 
(3) growth of domestic credit; (4) inflation; (5)  output growth; (6) employment 
growth; (7) unemployment rate; (8) central government budget surplus (+) or 
deficit (-),  expressed as a percentage of GDP; and (9) current account surplus 
or deficit, again, as a percentage of GDP. 
Since the literature on currency crises does not  provide much guidance 
about the time horizon for these influences, we consider a range of plausible 
alternatives. At the short end of  the spectrum, we allow only contemporary 
influences to affect the probability of a crisis. We  then allow for explanatory 
variables lagged up to two quarters, one year, and two years. We  allow these 
lagged influences to operate jointly with the contemporaneous variables or by 
themselves (as would be appropriate if  lags in data collection or processing 
preclude the consideration of  contemporaneous developments). To  conserve 
degrees of  freedom, we model the lags using moving averages. Rather than 39  Contagious Currency Crises 
including the first and second lags of inflation separately, for example, we in- 
clude only a single term that is the average inflation differential in the two 
preceding quarters. 
This leads us to estimate the following model: 
= 0  otherwise, 
where wo,,  is a weight that corresponds to the “relevance” at time t of country 
j for country  i; Z(L)i,,  is an information set of  10 contemporaneous andor 
lagged control regressors; A  is the corresponding vector of  nuisance coeffi- 
cients; and E is a normally distributed disturbance representing a host of omit- 
ted influences that affect the probability of a currency crisis. Under the null 
hypothesis of no common shocks and no contagion, this equation can be esti- 
mated with standard least squares techniques. The null hypothesis of interest 
to us is HO: o  = 0. We interpret evidence against the null as being consistent 
with the existence of a contagion effect.” 
Our first weighting scheme quantifies the ties between countries i andj  using 
trade data. We  use the weights that the IMF has computed in the course of 
constructing its real multilateral effective exchange rates.’*  The IMF’s method- 
ology derives the weight forj  in country i’s effective exchange rate as a convex 
combination of bilateral import weights and double export weights, using trade 
in manufacturing. The weights use unit labor costs, which are widely consid- 
ered to be reliable indicators of international competitiveness. The weights are 
time invariant. They have been computed for our 20 industrial countries by the 
IMF and were created in October 1994. 
Thus our trade-weighting scheme is 
where EER,, is the weight for country j in country i’s IMF effective exchange 
rate index. 
Our second weighting scheme is intended to capture macroeconomic simi- 
larities whose existence is a potential channel for contagion. We  think of two 
countries as being “similar” if  they  display similar macroeconomic condi- 
tions-for  example, if they have similar rates of growth of domestic credit. We 
then test the hypothesis that an attack on the currency of country j affects the 
probability of an attack on the currency of country i. 
In  practice, implementing this notion depends on being able to measure 
“similarity.” We  concentrate on seven “focus variables” that appear to be the 
11. By way of contrast, Sachs et al. (1996) do not control for fundamentals when testing for con- 
12. Documentation and references regarding these weights are to be found in IFS. 
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subject of considerable attention among participants in foreign exchange mar- 
kets: (1) domestic credit growth (as always, relative to Germany); (2) money 
growth; (3) CPI inflation; (4) output growth; (5)  the unemployment rate; (6)  the 
current account (as always, in nominal GDP percentage points); and (7) the 
government budget deficit.I3  We  multiply the rate of GDP growth, the current 
account, and the government budget by -  1 in order to allow for easier compar- 
ison with the other four variables; this means that higher values are associated 
with greater risk. We  standardize the variables by  subtracting sample means 
and dividing the result by the sample standard deviation. In practice, we stan- 
dardize in two ways: we take a country-specific approach in which a country 
is compared only with itself (so that, e.g., the average rate of growth of French 
domestic credit is subtracted from the raw  series and then  divided by  the 
sample French credit growth standard deviation); alternatively, we take a time- 
specific approach in which the observations at one point in time are compared 
with observations for all 20 countries at that same point in time. The first ap- 
proach is appropriate if currency speculators compare credit growth in a coun- 
try in a quarter to that country’s own past credit growth; the second is relevant 
if speculators compare the country’s credit growth to that typical of other coun- 
tries in the same quarter. 
Having standardized the variables, we compute the macro weights as follows 
for the “country-specific” and “time-specific’’ standardizations, respectively: 
where @(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the standardized normal 
function, p&,)  is the country-specific (time-specific) sample average of vari- 
able x, u,(u,)  is the country-specific (time-specific) standard deviation of vari- 
able x,  and the x’s are the seven macroeconomic focus variables. 
Tiis specification implies that if  country j is attacked at time t and it is 
similar to country i in the sense of having similar standardized growth rates of 
relevant macroeconomic variables, then it receives a high weight on the conta- 
gion variable. If j and i have identical (standardized) domestic credit growth 
rates, the weight is unity; the more dissimilar are the growth rates (in the sense 
of  being distant in  terms of  the cumulative distribution), the lower is  the 
weight. If  i’s  credit growth is at the extreme lower end of i’s cumulative distri- 
bution whilej’s is at its upper end, then the weight is zero. 
Since we have two standardizing techniques (country and time specific) and 
seven focus variables, we obtain 14 sets of macroeconomic contagion weights. 
13. One could imagine adding focus variables. The presence of  capital controls and the total 
stock of external debt would be interesting, especially in the case of  developing countries. How- 
ever, such variables tend to move slowly. In  addition, our seven focus variables turn out to be 
extremely collinear in any case. 41  Contagious Currency Crises 
2.4  Results 
We  begin with the simplest test for contagion. We  test whether a crisis in 
country i at time t is affected by  an attack in the same quarter anywhere else 
in the world, after controlling for a variety of political and economic variables. 
This is an “unweighted” approach to contagion. The indicator variable is unity 
if  there is at least one attack elsewhere in the world during the quarter, and 
zero otherwise. Hence, both the number of attacks and their relevance for the 
country in question are ignored.14 
2.4.1  Unweighted Contagion Indicators 
These results are presented in table 2.1. Its five columns correspond to five 
assumptions about the appropriate time horizon for the regressors. Since probit 
coefficients are not easily interpretable, we report the effects of one-unit (per- 
centage point) changes in the regressors on the probability of speculative attack 
(again expressed in percentage points), evaluated at the mean of the data. We 
also tabulate the associated z-statistics, which test the null hypothesis of no 
effect. Statistics that are inconsistent with the null hypothesis of no effect at 
the 5 percent significance level are printed in boldface. Diagnostics appear at 
the bottom of the table, including an omnibus test for the joint significance of 
all coefficients. 
The results are consistent with the existence of  a contagion effect (i.e., an 
estimate of  w) that is economically important and statistically significant. A 
speculative attack elsewhere in the world increases the probability of a cur- 
rency crisis by  around 8 percentage points. However, though this finding is 
consistent with a contagion effect, it is not definitive for at least two reasons. 
First, it may simply reflect a common shock (e.g., a shock to our center country, 
Germany, that is not captured by our control regressors). Second, the impact 
of the control regressors is not what one would like. Indeed, the lack of strong 
sensible partial correlations between crisis incidence and traditional economic 
fundamentals makes us cautious of over interpreting the results. 
In Eichengreen et al. (1996) we provide details for a number of sensitivity 
analyses that we conducted. None disturbs the basic thrust of the findings. We 
think of these results as consistent with the evidence of contagion per se. How- 
ever, they do not shed light on its source. We turn next to that task. 
2.4.2  Trade Weights 
Table 2.2 substitutes our first set of  weights-those  based on the IMF’s 
REER weights and intended to capture bilateral trade linkages-for  the un- 
14. This simplest test for contagion is the focus of Eichengreen et al. (1996). We reproduce 
those results here to provide a point of reference and departure for the present analysis.  Our estima- 
tion technique does not ensure “model coherence”;  we condition our crisis measure on the inci- 
dence of crises elsewhere without taking into account the resulting expected conditional probabili- 
ties of the regressand. Table 2.1  Probit Results with Unweighted Contagion Variable 
Variable 
Moving  Moving  Moving 
Average of  Moving  Average of  Average of 
Contemporaneous  Average of  Contemporaneous  Contemporaneous 
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Nora: Table reports probit slope derivatives (X 100, to convert into percentages) and, in parentheses, associated z-statistics (for hypothesis of no effect). Model is 
estimated with a constant, by maximum likelihood. Slopes significantly different from zero at the .05 value are in boldface. Table 2.2  Probit Results with Contagion Variable Weighted by International Trade 
Variable 
Moving  Moving  Moving 
Average of  Moving  Average of  Average of 
Contemporaneous  Average of  Contemporaneous  Contemporaneous 
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Nores: Table reports probit slope derivatives (X 100, to convert into percentages) and, in parentheses, associated z-statistics (for hypothesis of no effect). Model is 
estimated with a constant, by maximum likelihood. Slopes significantly different from zero at the .05 value are in boldface. 44  Barry Eichengreen and Andrew K. Rose 
weighted contagion variable. Trade weighting the contagion variable improves 
the fit of the equation. In contrast to the unweighted results in table 2.1, how- 
ever, it is not easy to interpret the size of the contagion variable, since it is no 
longer an indicator variable but is instead the product of a dummy and a trade 
weight. Nevertheless, the positive sign of the coefficient on the contagion vari- 
able indicates that an  attack elsewhere in the world still increases the probabil- 
ity of  an attack by a statistically significantly amount. The level of statistical 
significance for the contagion effect is higher than in table 2.1. 
We interpret this evidence as supporting the hypothesis that currency crises 
are transmitted, at least in part, via bilateral trade ties. It leads us to the belief 
that there is contagion, rather than simply a shock to an unmeasured fundamen- 
tal common to a number of countries. 
2.4.3  Macro Weights 
In table 2.3 we present results using the macro weights. We  substitute all 
seven macro-weighted contagion variables for the trade-weighted measure. 
The macro-weighted contagion proxies are generally insignificant at conven- 
tional statistical  levels when considered indi~idual1y.l~  However, the seven vari- 
ables are  jointly significant at high confidence  levels (the relevant chi-square  test 
statistic, labeled “contagion test,” is reported at the foot of  the table). This 
suggests collinearity among the seven contagion variables, as one would ex- 
pect. 
Table 2.4  provides direct evidence on the extent of this collinearity. It reports 
coefficients on the macro-contagion variables when the latter are included in 
the equation one by one. (The coefficient estimates for the political and macro- 
economic fundamentals  are not reported for ease of presentation.)  As expected, 
the estimated coefficients are positive, indicating that a currency crisis in  a 
country that is similar, in the relevant macroeconomic sense, raises the proba- 
bility of an attack on the domestic currency. The coefficients are statistically 
significant at standard confidence levels and do not vary much across macro- 
economic focus variables, conditioning set, or standardization technique. 
We  interpret this evidence as consistent with the existence of  macroeco- 
nomic contagion. But it answers only a subset of the relevant economic ques- 
tions. For example, is contagion spread through both trade and macroeconomic 
links? Or does one channel dominate the other? We  now proceed to these is- 
sues. 
2.4.4  Comparing the Trade and Macro Channels 
We are interested in testing the explanatory power of the different measures 
of  contagion against each other. This requires dealing with the collinearity 
15. This result does not depend on the conditioning set-specifically,  on whether the traditional 
political and macroeconomic fundamentals are entered only contemporaneously or with moving 
average lags as well. It is also insensitive to whether the macro weights are computed with vari- 
ables standardized by country or time period. Table 2.3  Probit Results with Contagion Variable Weighted by Macro Similarity: All Seven Contagion Variables Included Simultaneously 
Variable 
Country-Specific Averages  Time-Specific Averages 
Moving  Moving 
Moving  Average of  Moving  Average of 
Average of 2  Contemporaneous  Average of 2  Contemporaneous 
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.71 (3.1)  .42 (2.0) 
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.20 (.4)  .67 (1.3) 
.65 (2.0)  .69 (2.4) 
.33 (1.1)  .20 (.8) 
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-  .99 (.4) 
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Notes: Table reports probit slope derivatives (X 100, to convert into percentages) and, in parentheses, associated z-statistics (for hypothesis of  no effect). Model is 
estimated with a constant, by maximum likelihood. Slopes significantly different from zero at the .05 value are in boldface. Table 2.4  F’robit Results with Contagion Variable Weighted by Macro Similarity: Contagion Variables Included One by One 
Variable 
Country-Specific Averages  Time-Specific Averages 
Moving  Moving 
Moving  Average of  Moving  Average of 
Average of  Contemporaneous  Average of  Contemporaneous 
+ 8 Lags  Contemporaneous  2 Lags  + 8 Lags  Contemporaneous  2 Lags 
Crisis*Credit similarity  6.67 (3.7)  7.46 (4.4)  8.82 (4.1)  4.73 (2.7)  5.68 (3.4)  6.60 (3.2) 
Crisis*Inflation similarity  7.17 (4.1)  7.79 (4.7)  9.21 (4.4)  7.23 (4.2)  8.12 (4.9)  9.81 (4.8) 
Crisis*GDP similarity  6.03 (3.7)  5.74 (3.8)  6.84 (3.6)  5.41 (3.5)  4.81 (3.4)  5.90 (3.3) 
Crisis*Unemployment 
similarity  5.10 (3.4)  5.25 (3.6)  5.82 (3.2)  6.66 (4.3)  7.00 (4.8)  8.02 (4.5) 
Crisis*Current account 
similarity  7.35 (4.3)  1.53 (4.7)  8.91 (4.4)  7.40 (4.1)  7.26 (4.5)  9.05 (4.3) 
Crisis*Budget similarity  6.15 (3.7)  5.78 (3.8)  6.13 (3.1)  5.13 (3.2)  5.40 (3.6)  5.87 (3.1) 
Crisis*Money similarity  6.23 (3.8)  7.05 (4.4)  7.81 (3.8)  5.41 (3.3)  6.44 (4.0)  7.33 (3.7) 
Nores: Table reports probit slope derivatives (X 100, to convert into percentages) and, in parentheses, associated z-statistics (for hypothesis of no effect). Each model 
is estimated by maximum likelihood with a constant and seven political and macroeconomic controls. All reported slopes differ significantly from zero at the .01 value. 47  Contagious Currency Crises 
among our seven macro-contagion variables, for which purpose we employ 
factor analysis. 
Factor analysis both verifies the existence of multicollinearity and provides 
a convenient method of rank reduction. We estimated a single-factor model for 
the seven macro-contagion variables using the method of principal factors. The 
single-factor model works well for both the country-specific and time-specific 
standardizations.I6  We  use the resulting factor-a  linear combination of the 
seven macroeconomic variables-in  place of the vector of standardized vari- 
ables.” 
Table 2.5 reports estimates of the probit model when the effects of the differ- 
ent classes of contagion variables are estimated simultaneously. The three vari- 
ables correspond to those used in tables 2.1,2.2,  and 2.3:  they are unweighted, 
trade weighted, and weighted by the macro factor, respectively. As always, the 
full set of political and macroeconomic controls is included. 
Again there is overwhelming evidence consistent with contagion; a joint test 
of  the hypothesis that all three contagion variables are significant, which ap- 
pears at the foot of the table, is wildly inconsistent with the null of no conta- 
gion. The weighted measure designed to capture trade linkages remains posi- 
tive and highly significant, consistent with contagion via the trade channel. 
The unweighted measure is also positive and moderately significant at standard 
confidence levels, perhaps indicating that there is still evidence of  a shock 
to unmeasured common fundamentals. But now the macro factor is negative 
and insignificant for all three conditioning sets and both standardization tech- 
niques. 
Thus our results suggest that  contagious currency crises tend to  spread 
across countries mainly as a function of international trade links. In contrast, 
the  influence of  macroeconomic similarities disappears when  the  various 
classes of  contagion measures are included simultaneously. The continuing 
significance  of the unweighted measure of contagion, even when the trade- and 
macro-weighted measures are included simultaneously, suggests that conta- 
gion may also spread through other channels than those that we have empha- 
sized. 
2.4.5  Sensitivity Analysis 
We  have performed a number of robustness checks to investigate the sensi- 
tivity of  our finding that trade linkages are more important than macroeco- 
nomic similarities. For instance, we split our sample into two parts (at, e.g., 
16. Eg,  the first eigenvalue is substantially higher than the second (for both the country-specific 
and time-specific factors, the first eigenvalue is almost 6 while the second is less than 0.2). In 
addition, the first factor explains a high proportion of the data variance (close to  100 percent); 
the individual factor uniquenesses are low (never more than 30 percent). Finally, all the scoring 
coefficients are positive, as expected. 
17. Of  course, there are two factors, one for each of  the two standardizations (country and 
time specific). Table 2.5  Probit Results with Three Different Measures of Contagion 
Variable 
Country-Specific Averages  Time-Specific Averages 
Moving 
Moving  Average of 
Average of  Contemporaneous 
Moving 
Moving  Average of 
Average of 2  Contemporaneous 
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Notes:  Table reports probit slope derivatives (X 100, to convert into percentages) and, in parentheses, associated z-statistics (for hypothesis of  no effect). Model is 
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1974 and 1979) to check whether different models of contagion dominate dif- 
ferent parts of the sample. We have split our sample into observations in which 
capital controls are present and absent. We  have added additional macroeco- 
nomic fundamentals and compared macroeconomic and trade contagion chan- 
nels without our unweighted variable. None of these checks disturbs our basic 
finding that trade links are the more important conduit for the infectious spread 
of currency crises. 
2.5  Conclusions and Implications 
We  have sought to test for contagion in foreign exchange markets using a 
framework that distinguishes two channels of  international transmission of 
speculative attacks. The first channel is trade links, and the hypothesis is that 
attacks spill over contagiously to other countries with which the subject coun- 
try trades. The second channel is macroeconomic similarities, and the hypothe- 
sis is that attacks spread to other countries where economic policies and con- 
ditions are broadly similar. The first approach emphasizes the implications for 
competitiveness of an attack elsewhere in the world. The second focuses on 
the information content of an attack (where the assumption is that an attack on 
one country reveals information about market sentiment regarding the viability 
of a particular economic strategy). 
Using data for 20 industrial countries spanning more than three decades, we 
have tested these alternatives against the null of  no contagion. The null is 
decisively rejected: we find consistent, robust, and statistically significant evi- 
dence of contagious speculative attacks. This result poses a fundamental chal- 
lenge to those who would dismiss contagion out of  hand. The simplest test, 
using an unweighted contagion proxy, suggests that an attack elsewhere in the 
world raises the probability of an  attack on the domestic currency by 8 percent- 
age points, even after controlling for a substantial number of macroeconomic 
and political fundamentals. Strikingly, however, both the trade-weighted conta- 
gion proxy, designed to capture the first story sketched in the preceding para- 
graph, and the macro-weighted proxy, intended to capture the second, outper- 
form the naive unweighted contagion measure when they are included one at 
a time. We take this as confirmation that what our tests are picking up is conta- 
gion per se, and not only the effects of omitted environmental factors common 
to the countries in question (although the latter are still present). 
The effect of contagion operating through trade is stronger than that of con- 
tagion spreading as a result of  macroeconomic similarities. When measures 
of both mechanisms are included in the specification, trade-related contagion 
dominates the macro effect. Admittedly, similarities in macroeconomic poli- 
cies  and  performance across countries  are  more  difficult  to  capture  in  a 
weighting scheme than is the intensity of bilateral trade; the stronger showing 
of trade-related contagion may simply reflect our greater success in proxying 
for this effect. At the same time, considerable experimentation with alternative 50  Barry Eichengreen and Andrew K. Rose 
measures of macro-related contagion, all of which points to the same conclu- 
sion, lends some support to our favored interpretation  that it is trade links rather 
than macroeconomic similarities that have been the dominant channel for the 
contagious transmission in the sample period. 
In the 1960s, toward the beginning of our sample, the debate over contagion 
centered on the industrial countries. The fear was that a currency crisis in one 
industrial country might destabilize the exchange rate pegs of  the other ad- 
vanced industrial nations. The fallout from the 1967 devaluation of  sterling 
provides  some retrospective justification for these fears (see Eichengreen 
1996). Today the debate over contagion increasingly focuses on emerging mar- 
kets, in Latin America, Asia, and elsewhere (e.g., Sachs et al. 1996).  The nature 
of the data makes systematic cross-country analyses of the sort we undertake 
here more difficult for emerging markets. But it is clear that this should be a 
high priority for future research. 
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Comment  Takatoshi It0 
This paper is detective work by two doctors fighting an epidemic of financial 
crises. Determining whether the disease (financial crisis) is contagious, caused 
by a virus, or noncontagious but caused by an environmental change like a heat 
wave is the problem. 
The paper asks an interesting question: why do financial crises cluster in 
time? As the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis in 1992-93 
and the Mexican crisis and its aftermath vividly show, attacks on currencies 
appear to spread from one currency to another. Eichengreen and Rose con- 
struct a crisis indicator, EMP, as a weighted average of three variables: devalua- 
tion, interest hikes, and loss of foreign reserves-all  in relation to Germany. 
When EMP deviates by  more than  1.5 standard deviations, it is a crisis. A 
probit model is constructed to measure a contagion effect from another crisis 
controlling for  an environmental change. When  a  contagion effect is con- 
firmed, a further effort is made to identify a transmission process, whether 
through trade linkage or macroeconomic similarities. 
Takatoshi Ito is professor in the Institute of  Economic Research at Hitotsubashi University, 
Tokyo,  and a research associate of  the National Bureau of Economic Research. 52  Barry Eichengreen and Andrew K. Rose 
I comment on three aspects of this line of investigation: (1) on the definition 
of financial crises, (2)  on the effectiveness of controlling for an environmental 
change, and (3) on the coverage of countries and the frequencies of data. 
First of all I would like to comment on the correspondence between financial 
crises picked up by the EMP variable in this paper and situations that we com- 
monly think of as crises. Are there cases in which EMP flags a crisis but it is 
not what we commonly regard as a crisis (the first type of error)? Are there 
cases that we think of as a crisis that are not identified as such by  EMP (the 
second type of  error)? All three components of  EMP are measured against 
Germany. So, if  for some reason a speculation that the deutsche mark will 
appreciate develops in the market, it would show up as widespread financial 
crises among other currencies. Although it is a German problem, it appears as 
contagious crises among other countries. A large depreciation or devaluation 
is often a much-needed “correction” of a misalignment (overvalued currency), 
and not necessarily a “crisis.” The sharp depreciation of the U.S. dollar (vis-8- 
vis the deutsche mark) in 1985-86, partly engineered by the Plaza Accord, was 
hardly a crisis, but rather an adjustment of the U.S. dollar from an overvalued 
level to more or less an equilibrium level. If  the U.S. dollar in  1985-86  is 
flagged by EMP as being in crisis, it may be an error of the first type. In gen- 
eral, the EMP variable does not differentiate a depreciation of  a disturbing 
nature (causing misalignment) from a corrective depreciation (restoring equi- 
librium). 
We  typically think of  a financial crisis as an acute attack by  speculators. 
Speculative pressures on a currency may  be short-lived or long-lasting. For 
example, the “contagious” tequila effect on East Asian currencies, which was 
indeed caused by  speculators according to market participants, did not last 
long. The duration of pressure (evidenced by depreciation, interest hike, or loss 
of reserves) ranged from one day for Hong Kong, to a few weeks for Thailand 
and the Philippines. Since most Asian countries restored their precrisis levels 
of  exchange rate, interest rate, and reserves within the quarter (the frequency 
used in this investigation), none of the Asian currency crises in the wake of the 
Mexican crisis would have been picked up by  EMP, had the paper covered 
these currencies. This episode is an example of an error of the second type. 
In  order to control for noncontagious environmental changes, the probit 
model of crisis is regressed on, not only the crisis indicator of other countries, 
but also environmental changes. Since these variables are included simply to 
control for possible linkage from fundamentals to a crisis probability, it ap- 
pears enough to “cast a net” as widely as possible. The statistical significance 
or magnitude of  the coefficients on these variables is not of  interest in itself. 
However, if such a variable has a statistically significant coefficient, that result 
needs to be interpreted. Table 2.3 shows that only two variables have statisti- 
cally significant coefficients: the inflation rate  and the unemployment rate. 
These should be interpreted by explaining how they would lead to a financial 
crisis. One might question a linear specification on the grounds that a crisis is 53  Contagious Currency Crises 
often a nonlinear process, in that deviation of  a macro variable, such as the 
inflation rate or the unemployment rate, would not become a concern until it 
went beyond the usual band of  business cycles. This kind of criticism of  a 
linear specification is “unfair” in usual discussions of empirical work. How- 
ever, in this work, the problem is more serious, as one of the possible transmis- 
sion channels of  contagion, “macroeconomic similarity,” is tested.  Several 
variables measuring macroeconomic similarity, “focus variables,” also appear 
among the control variables. The contagion weight of macroeconomic similar- 
ity shows up only when the other country is attacked. It is likely that the nonlin- 
ear effect of the macroeconomic variables on causing a crisis independently in 
several countries is picked up in this term. For this reason, I am more con- 
vinced by  trade linkage than by  macroeconomic similarities as a contagion 
transmission mechanism. 
Estimating the power of contagion is an attempt to isolate the “carrier” of 
the transmission virus. Suppose that a financial crisis in country j  triggers a 
change in investors’ expectations about the variability of country i.  The usual 
market talk is that investors-cum-speculators look for countries under similar 
conditions to attack after a success in attacking one country. Obviously, expec- 
tations about the probability of  success in  an attack suddenly change. Any 
econometric attempt to specify trade links and macroeconomic similarities can 
be regarded as an attempt to read the minds of speculators. 
Last, I would like to encourage the authors to apply their technique to devel- 
oping countries. Although the paper’s introduction cites the Mexican crisis and 
the tequila effect as motivation, no Latin American countries are in the sample. 
Currently, only the OECD countries are used, so that the financial crises stud- 
ied in the paper have more or less been cases of misalignment among major 
currencies. Also the counts of crises indicate that crisis cases are dominated by 
two periods, the demise of Bretton Woods and the first oil crisis, in 1971-73, 
and the ERM crisis, in 1992.  Again these are very much German problems or, 
more broadly speaking, European problems. Naturally, the trade link variable 
works. A true test of contagion would be to apply the technique to emerging 
market crises, like the ones in 1982 and 1995. 
The choice of quarterly data may miss a temporary, unsuccessful crisis. At 
the height of the ERM crisis the Swedish overnight interest rate was raised to 
500 percent for a few days in an attempt to fend off speculators, but the result 
was depreciation (so counted as a crisis from the point of view of depreciation 
but not interest rate hikes). Several Asian countries employed various mea- 
sures, including higher interest rates and intervention in January 1995, to fend 
off the tequila effect. The defense was successful and capital flows came back 
by  March. Hence, the Asian countries in the first quarter of  1995 would not 
show signs of stress. From the finance viewpoint, attacks come and go quickly, 
especially those of  a contagious nature, and the quarterly frequency is too 
coarse to catch them. 54  Barry Eichengreen and Andrew K. Rose 
COlllment  Ronald I. McKinnon 
This ingenious paper addresses a very important issue: to what extent do cur- 
rency crises show contagion? Everyone agrees that currency crises come in 
clusters, whether at the end of the fixed-rate dollar standard in 1971-73,  the 
great debt crisis among less developed countries in 1981-82,  the breakdowns 
of the ERM in 1992-93,  or-beginning  with Mexico in late 1994-the  tequila 
speculative attacks on the currencies of similar emerging market countries in 
early 1995. However, because of data limitations, Eichengreen and Rose’s for- 
mal statistical analysis covers just 20 industrialized countries from the OECD. 
The authors define a speculative attack on any one country to be an unusual 
quarterly movement in the weighted average of changes in its exchange rate, 
interest rate, and exchange reserves relative to its German counterpart. (Ger- 
many is the center country in their analysis-and  something more than just 
a numCraire as I discuss below.) Beyond identifying the clustering of these 
speculative attacks, however, the authors go one difficult econometric step fur- 
ther. They try to distinguish “pure” contagion,  based on psychological or trade 
links with  countries that themselves suffer speculative attacks, from some 
common global economic factor that tends to affect most countries simultane- 
ously. Using a probit regression model, they estimate the probability of a spec- 
ulative attack on any one country where a crisis elsewhere is one explanatory 
variable. But to control for common factors other than a speculative crisis 
somewhere else, numerous macroeconomic variables-domestic  credit expan- 
sion, level of unemployment, current account surplus, and so on, as shown in 
their table 2.1-are  also right-hand-side explanatory variables. 
The conceptual problem then becomes whether these macroeconomic con- 
trol variables successfully proxy common economic factors roiling the world 
economy that each country faces simultaneously.  If not, the authors’ regression 
method gives too much weight to “crises elsewhere.” That is, pure contagion 
will be overweighted. And this would also be true when  the authors trade- 
weight the importance of crises elsewhere (table 2.2), as always using consid- 
erable ingenuity. 
Unfortunately, this method of control is not strong enough. It founders on 
the fact that the macroeconomic control variables simultaneously represent 
two kinds of disturbances that could foment currency crises: (1) disturbances 
that are peculiar to each country itself and (2) general disturbances  in the world 
economy. Inability to distinguish between the two would not matter if either 
kind of shock registered unambiguously (i.e., in the same direction) the proba- 
bility of a currency crisis. However, the effects of the two kinds of shocks on 
the macroeconomic control variables often offset each other. Thus the impact 
of general disturbances in the world economy are not fully factored out. 
Let me illustrate this offsetting effect with a leading example of a “general” 
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disturbance, that is, one emanating from the center country in the world econ- 
omy. Consider the enormous fiscal expansionxum-tight  money in Germany 
in the early 1990s, leading the German current account to swing from a large 
annual surplus to a substantial deficit-a  $70 billion swing from 1990 to 1992. 
Everyone now agrees that this major shock contributed to numerous specula- 
tive attacks on European currencies in  1992-93.  But how would this shock 
show up in the right-hand-side variables of the regression model? Would it be 
consistent with the expected signs of Eichengreen and Rose’s macroeconomic 
control variables? 
Not for some of them. In response to very tight money sucking in foreign 
financial capital and an emerging current account deficit in Germany, periph- 
eral countries were all forced to contract their domestic credit, disinflate, and 
allow their current account surpluses to increase in the course of  defending 
(perhaps unsuccessfully) their exchange rates. So given the prior expectations 
of  the regression model based on idiosyncratic shocks, these three variables 
each move the “wrong” way in response to the German fiscal expansion. For 
example,  just before a speculative attack on the currencies of other ERM coun- 
tries, domestic credit in each of them would be contracting-rather  than ex- 
panding as the model would have it. (Similarly, in response to this common 
international shock, domestic inflation and the current account would move in 
the “wrong” directions and not accurately reflect the fact that the currency in 
question was under attack because of the German fiscal expansion.) 
Alternatively, if  domestic credit suddenly expanded because, say, of  some 
domestic political breakdown, then a currency crisis-cum-devaluation would 
likely follow. The sign of  the domestic credit variable would then be “right,” 
that is, positive. The problem is that the regression model juxtaposes both do- 
mestic and international shocks in the control variables-with  domestic credit 
rising in the former case and falling in the latter just prior to devaluation. This 
offsetting effect then weakens, and possibly largely negates, domestic credit 
as a control variable-along  with domestic inflation and the current account 
surplus as control variables. 
In summary, I think that common factors are still largely responsible for the 
clustering of  currency crises. But my  heart is with the authors in believing 
that pure contagion is important in some circumstances. Nevertheless, their re- 
gression model seems to overstate the strength of the pure contagion effect. This Page Intentionally Left Blank